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Abstract
Loewenstein (1996, 2005) identiﬁes an intrapersonal empathy gap. In the respec-
tive experiments, subjects make choices with delayed consequences. When entering
the state where these consequences would unfold, they get the possibility to revise
their initial choice. Revisions are more substantial when these two choices are made
in diﬀerent emotional states. The concept of the empathy gap suggests that the
initial choice represents a misprediction of future preferences. However, it might
alternatively be based on a well understood disagreement with future preferences.
In this sense, people would like to add: “But don’t ask me again!” To disentangle
both explanations, we induce two diﬀerent emotional states in each subject and
oﬀer a self-commitment device in the ﬁrst state. In one condition, subjects move
from a “cold” state of reﬂection to a “hot” state of impulsiveness. In the other
condition, this order is reversed. We ﬁnd evidence for the hot-to-cold empathy gap,
but not for the cold-to-hot empathy gap when subjects can self-commit to their
initial choice.
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The intrapersonal empathy gap describes the inability to put oneself in the shoes of
one’s later alter ego in a diﬀerent emotional state. Usually, “hot” and “cold” states
are distinguished. Hot states like hunger, fear, arousal, or fatigue, are deﬁned by the
presence of elevated visceral factors while cold states are deﬁned by their absence
(Loewenstein 1996). Loewenstein (1996, 2005) distinguishes between a “cold-to-
hot” and a “hot-to-cold empathy gap”. The former describes people’s inability in
cold states to foresee how they will react in the “heat of the moment”. The latter
describes people’s inability to anticipate how transient their current hot desires
are. The concept of self-commitment, on the other hand, crucially depends on the
ability to anticipate one’s future deviation from today’s optimal plan (see, e.g.,
Strotz 1956 or O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001). Soman et al. (2005, p. 352) note
that one should be cautious with assuming this kind of “sophistication” (Hammond
1976), because it is inconsistent with ﬁndings on consumer misprediction and the
intrapersonal empathy gap. In our opinion, this argument can be reversed: one
should be cautious with the assumption that people naively mispredict, because it
is inconsistent with the evidence on sophisticated self-commitment (see, e.g., Ariely
and Wertenbroch 2002, Ashraf et al. 2006, DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006, Casari
2009, or Uhl 2010).
In an experiment with smokers, Sayette et al. (2008) elicited participants’ pref-
erences for smoking in two diﬀerent emotional states. In the ﬁrst session, all par-
ticipants had to state their minimum compensation for postponing smoking in a
second session which took place several days later. They were informed that they
would be in a hot state of high craving in the second session. Experimenters would
make sure that they were nicotine deprived for at least twelve hours. Additionally,
they would be exposed to the stimulus of a burning cigarette. For the ﬁrst session,
participants arrived in two conditions to which they had been randomly assigned.
They were either also in a hot state, nicotine deprived for at least twelve hours, or
in a cold state, having smoked as usual. Participants in the hot state submitted
higher minimum compensations to postpone smoking in the second session than
those in the cold state. In the second session, participants got the surprising possi-
bility to revise their initially stated minimum compensation for postponing smoking
(Sayette et al. 2008, p. 929). Those who had submitted their initial minimum com-
pensation in an emotionally diﬀerent cold state of low craving raised it signiﬁcantly
more than those who had stated it in a hot state of high craving. The authors
interpret the fact that the initial choice in one emotional state is systematically
diﬀerent from the revised choice in another emotional state as a misprediction, an
inability to anticipate a later self’s diﬀerent needs: “[A]s predicted, in contrast to
smokers in the hot group, smokers in the cold group underpredicted the value they
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Read and van Leeuwen (1998) let participants choose between a healthy and an
unhealthy snack. One group of participants was told that the experimenters would
come back the next day in the late afternoon and provide them with what they had
chosen. Part of this group made the initial choice in the late afternoon when hungry
while the other part made it immediately after lunch when satisﬁed. The following
late afternoon, when participants arrived to collect their snacks, the experimenters
pretended that they had no record of participants past choices and encouraged
them to choose whatever they wanted. Participants who had made their initial
choice in a satisﬁed state changed signiﬁcantly more often to an unhealthy snack
than those who had made their initial choice in a hungry state. According to Read
and van Leeuwen (1998, p. 191), “[t]he intrapersonal empathy gap is measured by
taking the diﬀerence between advance choices made in the same state of appetite in
which a snack will be consumed and those made in a diﬀerent state”. The authors
are aware of the ambiguity we address in this study. At the end, they discuss the
problem of disentangling an inability to predict future wants, a true empathy gap,
with the attempt to impose a “better judgment” of advance choices on a future self
(Read and van Leeuwen 1998, p. 201).
If participants’ current choices unfold delayed consequences, the prediction of
future tastes is crucial. However, the mere divergence of preferences between diﬀer-
ent emotional states need not mean that participants mispredict. The preference
divergence may be a well understood disagreement of a decision maker in one state
with her own preferences in a diﬀerent state. In particular, if the possibility to revise
an earlier choice comes to participants as a surprise, it is not clear how to interpret
the earlier choice. In the discussed experiments, it is diﬃcult to assess whether par-
ticipants’ initial choice was a naive plan or a sophisticated self-commitment which
only turned out to be ineﬀective because the experimenters did not enforce it. Ex-
perimenters did not ask participants: “Shall we ask you again later?” Assume that
we hear Ulysses’s plan to sail past the sirens, but then observe that he obeys their
voices and jumps over board. Only the availability of the mast allows to understand
whether he fatally underestimated his future desire or whether he found nothing to
tie himself to. The aim of this experiment is to disentangle both explanations. In
contrast to previous studies on the intrapersonal empathy gap, we put a mast in
the middle of the ship. Choices in two diﬀerent emotional states are elicited and the
possibility to revise in the second state is announced in the ﬁrst state. Participants
are then oﬀered a salient self-commitment device. We are interested in whether the
empathy gap persists in the presence of this device. A symmetric design, where
participants either get the chance to self-commit to their cold choice or to their hot
choice, allows us to test for both variants of the intrapersonal empathy gap.
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The experiment consisted of two online sessions and one ﬁnal laboratory session. In
the invitation, participants were informed about this fact and that they should have
internet access at home if they wanted to participate. Additionally, they were told
that the sessions would take place on three consecutive Tuesdays or Wednesdays,
respectively. The online sessions took just a few minutes and the ﬁnal laboratory
session was only needed to provide payments. Each session was conducted in a
strictly limited time frame which participants did not know before registration.
They were therefore asked to register only if they had no important appointments
before noon on the days of the three sessions.
2.1 Cold-to-Hot and Hot-to-Cold Condition
One day after the end of the registration period, participants received an e-mail in
which they were informed about the time frame of the ﬁrst online session. Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to a “Cold-to-Hot” or a “Hot-to-Cold Condition”
with equal probabilities. To induce emotionally diﬀerent states, we exploited the
natural presence or absence of fatigue at diﬀerent times of the day. We use the
terms “cold” and “hot” to distinguish between a situation in which participants
were presumably well rested and one in which they were presumably sleepy. In
both states, they made a choice with delayed consequences for which their state of
fatigue should have mattered. This choice was about how early to show up to the
ﬁnal laboratory session to collect their participation fee.
Participants assigned to the Cold-to-Hot Condition had to log in to the ﬁrst
online session between 10.30 and 11.00 a.m. Those assigned to the Hot-to-Cold
Condition had to log in to the ﬁrst online session between 5.30 and 6.00 a.m. For
the second online session, time frames of the two conditions were switched (see
Table 1). Those who were participating in the ﬁrst online session between 10.30
and 11.00 a.m. had to log in to the second online session between 5.30 and 6.00
a.m. Accordingly, those who were participating in the ﬁrst online session between
5.30 and 6.00 a.m. had to log in to the second online session between 10.30 and
11.00 a.m. However, participants did not learn about the exact time frame of the
second online session before the ﬁrst online session.
Table 1: Cold-to-Hot and Hot-to-Cold Condition
Condition 1st Online Session 2nd Online Session
Cold-to-Hot 10.30 to 11.00 a.m. 5.30 to 6.00 a.m.
Hot-to-Cold 5.30 to 6.00 a.m. 10.30 to 11.00 a.m.
Participants were sensitized that each link was only active during the 30 minutes
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sessions and personal attendance at the laboratory session was necessary to be
eligible for payment. Participants were informed that an individualized web link
to access the ﬁrst online session would be send to them on the day before the ﬁrst
online session by 2 p.m. Along with the link they received a reminder of the time
frame in which it was active.
2.2 The Self-Commitment Possibility
In the ﬁrst online session, participants were instructed that payments for participa-
tion in the online experiment could be collected on the day of the ﬁnal laboratory
session from 6.00 to 9.00 a.m. This three hours time frame was divided into twelve
smaller time slots of 15 minutes each. The payment for participation depended on
the time slot in which participants showed up for the ﬁnal laboratory session to
collect it. Payments were linearly decreasing as time slots got later (this procedure
is similar to Uhl 2010). Participants were instructed that they had to choose the
time in which they wanted to show up for the ﬁnal laboratory session already in
the online sessions. If they showed up earlier than to the chosen time slot, they
had to wait until its start time. If they showed up later than its end time, they
did not receive any payment. For now, participants were only presented the list of
time slots in which they could show up (see Table 2). When participants pressed
“Continue”, they saw the next screen.
Table 2: Time Payment Scheme
Time Slot Earliest Arrival Latest Arrival Payment
(a.m.) (a.m.) (¤)
1 6.00 6.15 16.90
2 6.15 6.30 16.10
3 6.30 6.45 15.30
4 6.45 7.00 14.50
5 7.00 7.15 13.70
6 7.15 7.30 12.90
7 7.30 7.45 12.10
8 7.45 8.00 11.30
9 8.00 8.15 10.50
10 8.15 8.30 9.70
11 8.30 8.45 8.90
12 8.45 9.00 8.10
Participants were told that they would have to choose the time slot in which
they wanted to show up for the ﬁnal laboratory session soon. Before that, they were
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session (see Table 1).
Furthermore, participants were precisely instructed about the second online
session in which they were asked to remake their time slot choice. Available time
slots and payments in the second online session were identical to the ones in the
ﬁrst online session. In the second online session, they could choose any new time
slot including the one, of course, which they would soon choose in this ﬁrst online
session. At the end of the second online session, one of the two time slot choices,
which could but need not coincide, would then be randomly drawn to be relevant for
them. They would then be instantly informed about the result of the random draw.
Therefore, it was now clear to participants that the second online session took place
at a substantially diﬀerent time of day at which they had the possibility to revise
their initial choice. Thus, in both conditions they had the chance to anticipate that
their revised choice could be “biased” from the emotional perspective that they
were currently in.
The ﬁrst choice that participants made concerned the probabilities with which
the random draw between their two time slot choices was ﬁnally made. To make
the probability weighting of the random draw easily accessible to participants, we
described their two alternatives with the help of a virtual urn with ten balls whose
composition they could determine. Participants could choose between the two
following alternatives.1
1. Self-Liberation. 2 balls represent your choice of today while 8 balls represent
the choice which you will make in the second online session.
2. Self-Commitment. 8 balls represent your choice of today while 2 balls
represent the choice which you will make in the second online session.
The ﬁrst alternative gave a substantially higher weight to the choice made in
the second online session. Note that this second online session was one week closer
to the point in time where the real eﬀort of getting up had to be performed. In
an uncertain world without intrapersonal conﬂict, this is the more desirable option
since it allows to account for more recent information. We label this option “self-
liberation”. It is the natural choice for participants who (for right or wrong) do
not anticipate systematically deviant future preferences. Conversely, the second
alternative gave a substantially higher weight to the choice made in the ﬁrst online
session. Since this option promotes the initial choice at the cost of being less able
to react to new information, we label it “self-commitment”. It should have been
the natural choice for participants who primarily fear their future preferences. If
the ﬁrst-moving self fears that the second-moving self will state a biased deviant
1The labels we introduce here were not used in the experiment.
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by choosing one of the two alternatives in the ﬁrst online session, participants self-
selected into groups of “self-liberators” and “self-committers”.
2.3 Time Slot Choices
After choosing one of the alternatives and clicking “Continue”, the list with the
twelve time slots was presented again (see Table 2). Now, participants had to
choose one of them by marking the respective line and press “Continue”. This
was their ﬁrst time slot choice. After that, the ﬁrst online session was ﬁnished.
Participants were informed that they would receive the link for the second online
session on its eve before 2 p.m. along with a reminder of the time frame in which
it would be active.
In the second online session, one week after the ﬁrst one, the list of time slots
(see Table 2) was presented again and participants remade their time slot choice.
They were, however, not reminded of their ﬁrst time slot choice. After clicking
“Continue”, they were informed about the result of the random draw which was
performed according to their self-liberation or self-commitment choice. They then
learned about the consequences of the random draw for the laboratory session,
i.e., in which time slot and for what payment they had to show up. Finally, they
were reminded to bring their ID to the ﬁnal laboratory session. One day prior
to the laboratory session, they received a reminder per e-mail which restated the
consequences of the result of their random draw.
In the ﬁnal laboratory session, one week after the second online session, we used
a radio controlled clock to measure participants’ crossing of the threshold to the
laboratory. Participants then had to present their ID and it was checked whether
they had arrived to the correct time slot. If they came earlier than the start time
of the correct time slot, they had to wait. If they came later than its end time,
they did not receive anything. Otherwise, they received their payment.
3 Hypotheses
We expect a higher dropout rate in the Hot-to-Cold Condition than in the Cold-
to-Hot Condition. This is because participants got to know about the unpleasant
hot session at diﬀerent stages of the experiment. Participants in the Cold-to-Hot
Condition only received the information about the hot session in their ﬁrst online
session. In contrast to that, participants in the Hot-to-Cold Condition were in-
formed about the hot session already after the end of the registration period. This
means they were informed before having taken part in the ﬁrst online session. It is
therefore plausible to assume that more participants in the Hot-to-Cold Condition
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Hot-to-Cold Condition since they have not already invested in the experiment and
did not already participate in one online session. Dropouts do not happen randomly
but represent a self-selection: by trend, participants who are more averse to waking
up early will be more likely to drop out. This non-random dropout implies that
time slot choices are hardly comparable between the two conditions.
3.1 Main Hypotheses
The following hypotheses test for the existence of the cold-to-hot and the hot-to-
cold empathy gap when self-commitment devices are saliently available. First of
all, it is reasonable to assume that time slots chosen in the cold state will be earlier
than those chosen in the hot state. Participants in a hot state of fatigue should give
more weight to sleep relative to money than well rested participants in a cold state.
In this sense, the former are more empathic with their later alter ego who actually
has to get up for the ﬁnal laboratory session. In our design, participants chose to
be either self-liberators or self-committers. We check whether self-liberators, i.e.,
participants who did not choose to self-commit to their initial choice, show a sys-
tematic divergence between cold and hot choices. If this is the case, we identify an
intrapersonal empathy gap even in the presence of self-commitment devices.
Cold-to-Hot Empathy Gap Hypothesis: In the Cold-to-Hot Condition,
self-liberators’ ﬁrst time slot choices are more ambitious than their second time slot
choices.
Hot-to-Cold Empathy Gap Hypothesis: In the Hot-to-Cold Condition,
self-liberators’ ﬁrst time slot choices are less ambitious than their second time slot
choices.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis applies to the Cold-to-Hot Condition in which participants
make their ﬁrst choice between 10.30 and 11.00 a.m. and their second choice be-
tween 5.30 and 6.00 a.m. Therefore, participants make a cold choice in their ﬁrst
online session and are informed that they will make a hot choice in the second
online session. After being informed, they get a self-commitment device at hand. If
they anticipate systematically later time slot choices in the upcoming second online
session, they may use this device. Assume that those who did not use it, i.e. self-
liberators, choose systematically earlier time slots in the cold than in the hot state.
We then ﬁnd support for the interpretation that these participants systematically
mispredict their change of preferences from the cold to the hot state.
The second hypothesis is on the Hot-to-Cold Condition and mirror-imaged to
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6.00 a.m. and their second choice between 10.30 and 11.00 a.m. Here, participants
make a hot choice in their ﬁrst online session and are informed that they will
make a cold choice in the second online session. Analogously to the Cold-to-Hot
Condition, if participants in the hot state anticipate systematically earlier cold time
slot choices, they may use a self-commitment device. Assume that self-liberators
choose systematically later time slots in the hot than in the cold state. This supports
the interpretation that these participants systematically mispredict their change of
preferences from the hot to the cold state.
3.2 Ancillary Hypotheses
If the empathy gap hypotheses ﬁnd no support, we have to check whether our
manipulation worked at all and whether the self-liberation and self-commitment
alternatives were actually understood. Therefore, we check whether choices of self-
liberators and self-committers diﬀer in a plausible way. If this is the case, it supports
the idea that participants do not primarily choose self-commitment or self-liberation
because they are confused but interpret both alternatives meaningfully.
Ancillary Cold-to-Hot Hypothesis 1: If the cold-to-hot empathy gap hy-
pothesis ﬁnds no support, self-committers’ ﬁrst time slot choices are more ambitious
than their second time slot choices.
Ancillary Hot-to-Cold Hypothesis 1: If the hot-to-cold empathy gap hy-
pothesis ﬁnds no support, self-committers’ ﬁrst time slot choices are less ambitious
than their second time slot choices.
These ancillary hypotheses capture the idea that participants who show a sys-
tematic divergence between cold and hot choices anticipate this behavioral pattern
and self-select into the group of self-committers. Here, the self-commitment de-
vice works extrinsically: the ﬁrst-moving self marginalizes the anticipated deviant
choice of the second-moving self which is in an emotionally diﬀerent state. If we
also do not ﬁnd such a choice divergence for self-committers, we test whether self-
commitment devices may work intrinsically.
Ancillary Cold-to-Hot Hypothesis 2: If participants’ time slot choices are
consistent in the Cold-to-Hot Condition, self-committers’ ﬁrst time slot choices are
more ambitious than self-liberators’ ﬁrst time slot choices.
Ancillary Hot-to-Cold Hypothesis 2: If participants’ time slot choices are
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less ambitious than self-liberators’ ﬁrst time slot choices.
If choices are consistent, we should identify systematically diﬀerent ambitions
between self-liberators’ and self-committers’ plans. As the possibility to revise the
initial choice does not come as a surprise in this experiment, participants may also
achieve consistency via internal self-commitment, for instance, by making a resolu-
tion. Choosing self-commitment may have a self-fulﬁlling eﬀect and therefore suﬃce
to achieve choice consistency. In this sense, it may work intrinsically. In this case,
second time slot choices will not deviate systematically from ﬁrst time slot choices.
If participants’ time slot choices are consistent, we compare self-committers’ plans,
i.e., their ﬁrst time slot choices, with those of self-liberators. In the Cold-to-Hot
Condition, self-committers’ plans should be more ambitious than self-liberators’.
Participants should be more likely to self-commit to relatively ambitious plans fa-
voring more money which are more easily spoiled by a “sleepy self”. Vice versa,
in the Hot-to-Cold Condition, self-committers’ plans should be less ambitious than
self-liberators’. Participants should be more likely to self-commit to relatively un-
ambitious plans favoring the need to sleep which are more easily spoiled by a “greedy
self”.
4 Results
The experiment was conducted in January and February 2011. We invited 170 stu-
dents from various disciplines of the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany.
The online surveys were created with the open source application LimeSurvey, and
participants were recruited with the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004).
Eighty-ﬁve participants were assigned to the Cold-to-Hot Condition while an-
other 85 were assigned to the Hot-to-Cold Condition. In the Cold-to-Hot Condition,
7 out of 85 participants (8.2 %) dropped out before the ﬁrst online session, and a
total of 20 out of 85 participants (23.5 %) dropped out before the ﬁnal laboratory
session. In the Hot-to-Cold Condition, 26 out of 85 participants (30.6 %) dropped
out before the ﬁrst online session, and a total of 35 out of 85 participants (41.2 %)
dropped out before the ﬁnal laboratory session. Table 3 presents an overview of
total dropouts in both conditions. A comparison shows that dropouts were actually
substantially higher in the Hot-to-Cold Condition.
In the Cold-to-Hot Condition, 31 out of the 65 participants (47.7 %) who partic-
ipated in both online sessions chose the self-liberation alternative. The remaining
34 out of 65 participants (52.3 %) chose the self-commitment alternative. In the
Hot-to-Cold Condition, 19 out of the 50 participants (38.0 %) who participated in
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Cold-to-Hot Hot-to-Cold
Finished 65 (76.5 %) 50 (58.8 %)
Dropouts 20 (23.5 %) 35 (41.2 %)
All 85 (100.0 %) 85 (100.0 %)
both online sessions chose self-liberation. The remaining 31 out of 50 (62.0 %) chose
self-commitment. The fraction of self-committers is therewith relatively high com-
pared to other experiments with self-commitment options, in which experimenters
identiﬁed about one third of participants as self-committers (see, e.g., Ashraf et al.
2006, Casari 2009, or Uhl 2010). Table 4 presents an overview of self-liberation and
self-commitment choices in both conditions.
Table 4: Self-Liberation and Self-Commitment Choices
Cold-to-Hot Hot-to-Cold
Self-Commitment 34 (52.3 %) 31 (62.0 %)
Self-Liberation 31 (47.7 %) 19 (38.0 %)
All 65 (100.0 %) 50 (100.0 %)
In the following, we compare time slot choices made in cold states and in hot
states. Each choice is indexed by an integer from 1 to 12. Higher indexes mean
later time slots (see Table 2).
We ﬁrst turn our attention to the Cold-to-Hot Condition. According to one-
sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests, we cannot refute the null hypothesis that there is
no diﬀerence between self-liberators’ cold and hot time slot indexes (W = 28.5, p =
0.361) (see Table 5). This means that self-liberators’ do not tend to choose earlier
time slots in the cold than in the hot state. Accordingly, self-liberators’ cold time
slot choices are not more ambitious than their hot ones. The Cold-to-Hot Empathy
Gap Hypothesis is therefore not supported.
Table 5: Cold-to-Hot Condition: Self-Liberators’ Cold vs. Hot Choices
Mean Median Std.Dev.
Cold 2.77 1.00 2.60
Hot 2.80 1.00 2.58
W = 28.5 p = 0.361
We now turn our attention to the Hot-to-Cold Condition. One-sided Wilcoxon
signed rank tests ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive diﬀerence in self-liberators hot and cold
time slot indexes (W = 10.0, p = 0.0445) (see Table 6). This means that self-
liberators’ tend to choose later time slots in hot than in cold states. Accordingly,
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choices. We ﬁnd therefore support for the Hot-to-Cold Empathy Gap Hypothesis.
Table 6: Hot-to-Cold Condition: Self-Liberators’ Hot vs. Cold Choices
Mean Median Std.Dev.
Hot 2.37 1.00 2.56
Cold 1.84 1.00 1.83
W = 10.0 p = 0.0445
Since we did not ﬁnd support for the Cold-to-Hot Empathy Gap Hypothesis,
we check for diﬀerences in self-liberators’ and self-committers’ time slot choices to
make sure that participants were not confused by these alternatives.
We ﬁrst check whether self-committers, in contrast to self-liberators, exhibit a
systematic divergence between cold and hot time slot choices. According to one-
sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests, the null hypothesis that there is no diﬀerence
between cold and hot time slot indexes cannot be refuted (W = 18.0, p = 0.304)
(see Table 7). This means that self-committers’ tend not to choose earlier time
slots in the cold than in the hot state. Accordingly, self-committers’ cold time slot
choices are not more ambitious than their hot time slot choices. Thus, we do not
ﬁnd support for Ancillary Cold-to-Hot Hypothesis 1.
Table 7: Cold-to-Hot Condition: Self-Committers’ Cold vs. Hot Choices
Mean Median Std.Dev.
Cold 1.82 1.00 1.64
Hot 1.91 1.00 1.53
W = 18.0 p = 0.304
Since self-committers and self-liberators chose consistently in the Cold-to-Hot
Condition, we check whether self-committers were signiﬁcantly more ambitious in
their plans of how early to get up. For this purpose, we compare the ﬁrst time slot
choices of both groups. One-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests ﬁnd a signiﬁcant nega-
tive diﬀerence between self-committers’ and self-liberators’ ﬁrst time slot indexes
(U = 636.5, p = 0.0467) (see Table 8). This means that self-committers’ tend
to choose earlier ﬁrst time slots in the cold state than self-liberators. Accordingly,
self-committers tend to make more ambitious plans than self-liberators in the Cold-
to-Hot Condition. We therefore ﬁnd support for Ancillary Cold-to-Hot Hypothesis
2.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the persistence of the cold-to-hot and the hot-to-cold empathy gap in
a framework where self-commitment devices were saliently available. In two mirror-
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Mean Median Std.Dev.
Self-Committers 1.82 1.00 1.64
Self-Liberators 2.77 1.00 2.60
U = 636.5 p = 0.0467
imaged conditions, we induced intrapersonal conﬂict in participants. Half of them
were ﬁrst put in a cold state and subsequently in a hot state while the other half
entered states in the reversed order. Participants were informed about the exact
course of the experiment and could therefore anticipate their deviant behavior in
an upcoming diﬀerent emotional state. Each participant got the possibility to self-
commit to her initial choice in the ﬁrst state.
We ﬁnd evidence for the persistence of the hot-to-cold empathy gap when self-
commitment devices are available. When oﬀered a self-commitment device, a sub-
stantial fraction of participants in both conditions does not use it. When moving
from the hot to the cold state, these self-liberators exhibit a systematic divergence
of preferences about how early to show up to the laboratory session in the predicted
direction.
When moving from the cold to the hot state, self-liberators’ choices about how
early to show up are consistent across states. Thus, no cold-to-hot empathy gap
can be identiﬁed. To understand whether participants anticipated potential intrap-
ersonal conﬂict in the Cold-to-Hot Condition at all, we checked for diﬀerences in
self-committers’ and self-liberators’ ﬁrst time slot choices to compare the ambition
of their plans. We ﬁnd that self-committers choose signiﬁcantly earlier ﬁrst time
slots than self-liberators. This supports the idea that self-committers, although
they achieved choice consistency on their own, took actions to make sure that their
relatively ambitious plans were not spoiled by a “sleepy self”. Accordingly, we ﬁnd
support for the idea that participants anticipated potential weakness of will and
intentionally self-selected into the group of self-committers.
Schelling (1984) was worried about the problem of the “authentic self”. He
feared that it would be diﬃcult in many situations of intrapersonal conﬂict to
identify the true or legitimate preferences of a person. The authentic self is the self
that we, as friends or benevolent politicians, should side with if we realize that a
person’s preferences in diﬀerent states are mutually exclusive (see also Read 2006).
In a review of Schelling, Elster (1985, p. 92) argues that the self which is able to
act strategically in that it binds its later ego is the authentic self: “I deny that
there are real-life examples of two selves - the self who wants to stay drunk and the
self who wants to stay sober - engaging in mutual strategic interaction. The sober
self tries to hide the bottle from the drunken self, but the latter does not similarly
try to deceive the former.”
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likely to anticipate the deviant behavior of a future self in a diﬀerent emotional
state. In this sense, our evidence suggests that the hot-to-cold empathy gap is
empirically more important than the cold-to-hot empathy gap. This implies that
self-commitment is a strategic advantage of the “cold self”. Therefore, for the cold
state, we should at least consider the possibility that participants are not simply
mispredicting but farsightedly disagreeing with future preferences in a diﬀerent
emotional state.
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to-Hot Condition (originally in German)
This appendix reports the on-screen instructions for the cold-to-hot condition (orig-
inally in German). The instructions for the hot-to-cold condition were identical
except for the fact that dates and times were modiﬁed accordingly.
1st Online Session
1st Screen
Welcome and thanks for your participation in this online experiment!
In the following, please press the button “continue” only after you have carefully
read the instructions provided on the screen.
Please press “continue” to proceed.
2nd Screen
Important information concerning the experiment:
You will receive your payment for participation on Tuesday, 08th February 2011,
between 6.00 and 9.00 a.m. in our computer laboratory in the Goethegalerie. As
you can see in the following table, this time frame is divided into twelve 15 minutes
time slots with diﬀerent payments.
Time Slot Earliest Arrival Latest Arrival Payment
(a.m.) (a.m.) (¤)
1 6.00 6.15 16.90
2 6.15 6.30 16.10
3 6.30 6.45 15.30
4 6.45 7.00 14.50
5 7.00 7.15 13.70
6 7.15 7.30 12.90
7 7.30 7.45 12.10
8 7.45 8.00 11.30
9 8.00 8.15 10.50
10 8.15 8.30 9.70
11 8.30 8.45 8.90
12 8.45 9.00 8.10
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want to show up to the laboratory. Your two choices may, but need not, coincide.
A random draw will determine at the end of the 2nd online session which of your
two choices will be relevant. Of course, you will be informed about this at the end
of the 2nd online session.
Please notice that you will only receive a payment during the time slot you have
chosen. If you show up earlier, you will have to wait. If you show up later, you will
not receive any payment.
The entrance “Schillerstraße” of the Goethegalerie (coming from the direction of
the L¨ obdergraben) will be open from 5.45 a.m. on. Crossing the threshold to the
computer lab is decisive for the time measurement which will be taken by us man-
ually with a radio-controlled clock.
Please press “continue” to proceed.
3rd Screen
On the following screen, you will be asked to choose a time slot. In the 2nd online
session, you will be asked to remake the choice of the time slot. The choice, which
you will then have, will be the same as today. You will be able to select any time
slot you like (including the time slot that you will choose today, of course).
Your 2nd online session will take place on Tuesday, 1st February 2011,
between 5.30 and 6.00 a.m. in the morning.
At the end of the 2nd online session, a random draw will decide whether your
choice from this online session or your choice from the 2nd online session will be
relevant for you. For this purpose, you determine the composition of a virtual urn
with 10 balls. In the following, you will choose how many of the balls represent
your choice of today, and how many of the balls represent the choice which you will
make in the 2nd online session.
To this end, please choose one of the following two alternative and then press
“continue” to proceed.
1. 2 balls represent your choice of today while 8 balls represent the choice which
you will make in the 2nd online session.
2. 8 balls represent your choice of today while 2 balls represent the choice which
you will make in the 2nd online session.
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Please choose now one of the time slots from the following list for the laboratory
session on Tuesday, 8th February 2011. Then please press “continue” to proceed.
Time Slot Earliest Arrival Latest Arrival Payment
(a.m.) (a.m.) (¤)
1 6.00 6.15 16.90
2 6.15 6.30 16.10
3 6.30 6.45 15.30
4 6.45 7.00 14.50
5 7.00 7.15 13.70
6 7.15 7.30 12.90
7 7.30 7.45 12.10
8 7.45 8.00 11.30
9 8.00 8.15 10.50
10 8.15 8.30 9.70
11 8.30 8.45 8.90
12 8.45 9.00 8.10
5th Screen
This 1st online session is now over.
On the eve of the 2nd online session before 2 p.m. you will receive an e-mail
with an access web link. In this e-mail, you will be reminded of the time frame
in which the web link will be activated. As a precaution, please log in 15 minutes




Welcome to the 2nd Online Session!
In the following, please press the button “continue” only after you have carefully
read the instructions provided on the screen.
Please press “continue” to proceed.
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Please choose one of the time slots from the following list for the laboratory session
on Tuesday, 8th February 2011. Then please press “continue” to proceed.
Time Slot Earliest Arrival Latest Arrival Payment
(a.m.) (a.m.) (¤)
1 6.00 6.15 16.90
2 6.15 6.30 16.10
3 6.30 6.45 15.30
4 6.45 7.00 14.50
5 7.00 7.15 13.70
6 7.15 7.30 12.90
7 7.30 7.45 12.10
8 7.45 8.00 11.30
9 8.00 8.15 10.50
10 8.15 8.30 9.70
11 8.30 8.45 8.90
12 8.45 9.00 8.10
3rd Screen
According to the composition of the urn which you have chosen in the 1st online
session, the random draw has selected the choice of the
1st (2nd) online session
to be relevant. This means that on Tuesday, 8th February 2011, you may show
up
between ... and ... a.m.
to our computer laboratory in the Goethegalerie to collect your payment of ...
¤. If you show up earlier, you will have to wait. If you show up later, you will not
receive any payment.
Please bring your ID to the laboratory session.
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